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1 INTRODUCTION 
Evidence-based policy has become a buzzword in most policy domains, including science, 
technology and innovation (STI) policies. Research efforts have indeed provided a significant 
amount of evidence: insights as to the nature and dynamics of knowledge creation, diffusion, 
and exploitation processes, lending theoretical justification for policy interventions. These 
results have influenced policy documents of major supranational organizations, too, such as 
the EU, the OECD and various UN organizations. Policy-making processes – in a broader 
sense: policy governance sub-systems – themselves, together with the impacts of various STI 
policy tools have also become subjects of thorough analyses. 
Evidence cannot be turned into an ‘optimal’ set of policy measures in an ‘objective’, 
‘scientific’ way as it needs to be interpreted in the context of given policy issues and then 
translated into actions. Moreover, different schools of thought offer contrasting policy advice, 
and perhaps more importantly, various actors also influence the policy-setting processes, 
pursuing their own interests and values. Thus, in spite of major research results, policy-
making is still more of an art than an easy-to-handle ‘technology’, that is, a set of proven 
methods prescribed in handbooks with engineering precision – and STI policies are no 
exception. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that the world of STI policy-making is characterized by major 
puzzles. One of these is the apparent contradiction between the perceived ‘European paradox’ 
and the still dominant view of the importance of ‘high-tech’ research and ‘high-tech’ sectors. 
The first claims that the European Union achieves excellent research results, but is ineffective 
in exploiting those. The policy response should thus be to put more emphasis on fostering 
knowledge exploitation. Yet, various EU documents and the policy practice discernible from 
the composition of important monitoring tools still ‘push’ for a science-push model of 
innovation. 
This chapter aims to analyze whether it is beneficial to focus on supporting high-tech 
research and promoting structural changes in favor of high-tech sectors, or, whether a 
different policy rationale, one promoting knowledge-intensive activities across the whole 
economy, would be more appropriate to enhance competitiveness and improve quality of life.1 
It is structured as follows: first, economics paradigms are compared briefly along their 
fundamental assumptions and underlying notions concerning innovation, as well as the major 
policy implications of these paradigms, contrasted with the policy rationales advanced by the 
EU and the OECD. The latter issue is analyzed in more detail by reviewing the choice and use 
of indicators in the Innovation Union Scoreboard (EC, 2013a), and in a 2013 league table 
compiled by the EC Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (EC, 2013b). The 
                                                
1 Financial support provided for research by AEGIS (EU RTD FP7, grant agreement No. 225134), and 
GRINCOH (EU RTD FP7, grant agreement No. 290657) is gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Gábor 
Kőrösi, Sandro Mendonça, Balázs Muraközy, Doris Schartinger, Matthias Weber, and seminar participants at the 
Institute of Economics, CERS, HAS for their comments on an earlier version. 
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concluding section highlights the potential drawbacks of the persistent high-tech myth, 
considers possible reasons for its perseverance and discusses policy implications of the 
systemic view of innovation. 
2 ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND MODELS OF INNOVATION 
The role of innovation in economic development is analyzed by various schools of economics 
in diametrically different ways.2 The underlying assumptions and key notions of these 
paradigms lead to diverse policy implications. 
2.1 Innovation in various schools of thought in economics 
Innovation had been a major theme in classical economics. Then neo-classical (general 
equilibrium) economics essentially abandoned research questions concerned with dynamics, 
and instead focused on static comparative analyses and optimization. Technological changes 
were treated as exogenous to the economic system. Given compelling empirical findings and 
new theoretical insights on firm behavior and the operation of markets, various branches of 
mainstream economics 3  have relaxed the most unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical 
economics; especially perfect information, deterministic environments, perfect competition, 
and constant or diminishing returns. Yet, ‘this literature has not addressed institutional issues, 
it has a very narrow concept of uncertainty, it has no adequate theory of the creation of 
technological knowledge and technological interdependence amongst firms, and it has no real 
analysis of the role of government’ (Smith, 2000: 75). 
The quintessential axiom of mainstream economics 4  is that rational agents seek to 
maximize their profits. Evolutionary economics of innovation, in contrast, stresses that 
uncertainty is inherent in innovation, and thus profit maximization is impossible on 
theoretical grounds. Whereas mainstream economics is concerned with the availability of 
information, innovation studies show that the success of firms depends on their accumulated 
knowledge – both codified and tacit – and skills, as well as learning capabilities. Information 
can be purchased, and hence can be accommodated in mainstream economics as a special 
good. Yet, knowledge – and a fortiori, the types of knowledge required for innovation – 
cannot be bought and used instantaneously. A learning process cannot be spared if one is to 
acquire knowledge and skills, and it is not only time-consuming, but the costs of trial and 
error need to be incurred as well. Thus, the uncertain, cumulative and path-dependent nature 
of innovation is reinforced. Cumulativeness, path-dependence and learning lead to 
heterogeneity both at micro and meso levels (Castellaci, 2008a; Dosi, 1988; Dosi et al. (eds), 
1988; Fagerberg et al. (eds), 2005; Hall and Rosenberg (eds), 2010; Malerba, 2002; Pavitt, 
1984; Peneder, 2010). 
                                                
2 Space limits only allow an incomplete introduction to the main ideas. For more detailed and nuanced accounts 
see e.g. Castellacci (2008b), Dosi (1988), Dosi et al. (eds) (1988), Fagerberg et al. (eds) (2005), Freeman (1994), 
Grupp (1998), Hall and Rosenberg (eds) (2010), Laestadius et al. (2005), Lazonick (2013); Lundvall and Borrás 
(1999), Nelson (1995), OECD (1998) and Smith (2000). 
3 Mainstream economics is constantly evolving, driven by its own ’internal’ dynamics as well as by integrating 
new notions, research questions and methods from various branches of economics. Its major features cannot, 
therefore, be precisely defined. For example, while representative agents were a central feature for decades, more 
recently heterogeneity has become a key issue, e.g. in the new trade theory. 
4 The so-called new or endogenous growth theory is not discussed here separately because its major assumptions 
on knowledge are very similar to those of mainstream economics (Lazonick, 2013; Smith, 2000). Knowledge in 
new growth models is reduced to codified scientific knowledge, in sharp contrast to the much richer 
understanding of knowledge in evolutionary economics of innovation. 
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Innovators are not lonely champions of new ideas. While talented individuals might 
develop radically new, brilliant scientific or technological concepts, successful innovations 
require different types and forms and knowledge, rarely possessed by a single organization. A 
close collaboration among firms, universities, public and private research organizations and 
specialized service-providers is, therefore, a prerequisite of major innovations. In other words, 
‘open innovation’ is not a new phenomenon at all (Mowery, 2009, von Hippel, 1988). 
Innovation co-operations can take various forms from informal communications through 
highly sophisticated R&D contracts to alliances and joint ventures (Freeman 1991, 1994, 
1995; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; OECD, 2001; Smith, 2000, 2002; Tidd et al., 1997). 
2.2 Policy rationales derived from theories 
As already stressed, different policy rationales can be drawn from competing schools of 
economic thought. Policy advice derived from mainstream economics is primarily concerned 
with market failures: unpredictability of knowledge outputs from inputs, inappropriability of 
full economic benefits of private investment in knowledge creation, and indivisibility in 
knowledge production lead to ‘suboptimal’ level of business R&D efforts. Policy 
interventions, therefore, are justified if they aim at (a) creating incentives to boost private 
R&D expenditures by ways of subsidies and protection of intellectual property rights, or (b) 
funding for public R&D activities. 
Evolutionary economics of innovation investigates the role of knowledge creation and 
exploitation in economic processes. This school considers various types and forms of 
knowledge, including practical or experience-based knowledge acquired through learning by 
doing, using and interacting. As these are all relevant for innovation, scientific knowledge is 
far from being the only type of knowledge required for a successful introduction of new 
products or processes, let alone non-technological innovations. As to the sources of 
knowledge, not only the results of in-house R&D activities, but those of other R&D projects 
are also widely utilized during the innovation process: extramural projects conducted in the 
same or other sectors, at public or private research establishments, home or abroad. More 
importantly, there are a number of other sources of knowledge, also essential for innovations, 
such as design, scaling-up, testing, tooling-up, trouble-shooting and other engineering 
activities, ideas from suppliers and users, inventors’ ideas and practical experiments (Hirsch-
Kreinsen et al. (eds), 2005; Klevorick et al., 1995; Lundvall (ed.), 1992; Lundvall and Borrás, 
1999; von Hippel, 1988). Innovative firms also utilize knowledge embodied in advanced 
materials, other inputs, equipment and software. All rounds of the Community Innovation 
Survey clearly and consistently show that firms regard a wide variety of sources of 
information as highly important to innovation.5 
The evolutionary account of innovation leads to sobering lessons concerning the very 
nature of policy-making, too: in a world of uncertainty, policy cannot bring about the 
optimum either. Furthermore, given the importance of variety, selection and uncertainty, the 
potentially successful policies are adaptive ones, that is, they rely on, and learn from, 
                                                
5 In contrast, the OECD classification of industries only takes into account expenditures on formal R&D 
activities, carried out within the boundaries of a given sector. More precisely, the so-called indirect R&D 
intensity has also been calculated as R&D expenditures embodied in intermediates and capital goods purchased 
on the domestic market or imported. Yet, it has been concluded that indirect R&D intensities would not 
influence the classification of sectors (Hatzichronoglou, 1997: 5). In other words, a number of highly successful, 
innovative firms, exploiting advanced knowledge created externally in distributed knowledge bases (Smith, 
2002) and internally by non-R&D processes, are classified as medium-low-tech or low-tech companies, just 
because their R&D expenditures are below the threshold set by the OECD. Some policy-makers then might 
easily think that it is not a mistake to neglect these sectors en bloc. 
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feedback from the selection process, which in turn leads to further variation (Metcalfe and 
Georghiou, 1998). In other words, policy formation is increasingly becoming a learning 
process (Lundvall and Borrás, 1999). Thus, policy evaluation and assessment practices are of 
crucial importance (Dodgson et al., 2011; Edler et al., 2012; Gök and Edler, 2012; OECD, 
1998, 2006a). Technology foresight can also contribute to design appropriate policies: more 
‘robust’ policies can be devised when (i) multiple futures are considered, and (ii) participants 
of foresight processes, given their diverse backgrounds, bring wide-ranging accumulated 
knowledge, experience, aspirations and ideas into policy dialogues. 
In sum, evolutionary economics of innovation posits that firms’ performance is largely 
determined by their abilities to exploit various types of knowledge, generated by both R&D 
and non-R&D activities. Knowledge generation and exploitation takes place in, and is 
fostered by, various forms of internal and external interactions. The quality and frequency of 
the latter are largely determined by the institutions – the ‘rules of the game’ – and other 
properties of a given innovation system, in which these interactions take place. STI policies, 
therefore, should aim at strengthening the respective innovation system and improving its 
performance by tackling systemic failures hampering the generation, diffusion and utilization 
of any type of knowledge required for successful innovation6 (Edquist, 2011; Foray (ed.), 
2009; Dodgson et al., 2011; Freeman, 1994; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; OECD, 1998; Smith, 
2000). From a different angle, deliberate, coordinated policy efforts are needed to promote 
knowledge-intensive activities in all sectors. 
2.3 Models of innovation 
The first models of innovation had been devised by natural scientists and practitioners before 
economists showed a serious interest in these issues.7 The idea that basic research is the main 
source of innovation was already proposed in the beginning of the 20th century, gradually 
leading to what is known today as the science-push model of innovation, forcefully advocated 
by Bush (1945). By the second half of the 1960s the so-called market-pull model contested 
that reasoning, portraying demand as the driving force of innovation. Then both became the 
variants of the linear model of innovation when Kline and Rosenberg suggested the chain-
linked model, stressing the non-linear property of innovation processes, the variety of sources 
of information, as well as the importance of various feedback loops. This latter one has also 
been extended into the networked model of innovation, more recently called the multi-
channel interactive learning model (Caraça et al., 2009). 
In sum, the science-push model of innovation had become widely accepted before the 
market failure policy rationale was first expressed in the late 1950s, but the latter has certainly 
lent scientific support to the former by focusing policy-makers’ attention to R&D as the 
decisive element of innovation processes.8 
                                                
6 In an attempt to systematically compare the market and systemic failure policy rationales, Bleda and del Río 
(2013) introduce the notion of evolutionary market failures, and reinterpret the neoclassical market failures as 
particular cases of evolutionary market failures, relying on the crucial distinction between knowledge and 
information. 
7 This brief account can only list the most influential models; Balconi et al. (2010), Caraça et al. (2009), 
Dodgson and Rothwell (1994) and Godin (2006) offer detailed discussions on their emergence, properties and 
use for analytical and policy-making purposes. 
8 For a thorough analysis refuting the high-tech myth, see e.g. Sandven et al. (2005). 
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3 INDICATORS: NEUTRAL MEASUREMENT TOOLS OR HERALDS OF POLICY CONCEPTS? 
Significant progress has been achieved in measuring R&D and innovation activities since the 
1960s (Grupp, 1998; Grupp and Schubert, 2010; Smith, 2005) with the intention to provide 
comparable data sets as a solid basis for assessing R&D and innovation performance and 
thereby guiding policy-makers in devising appropriate policies.9 Although there are widely 
used guidelines to collect data on R&D and innovation – the Frascati and Oslo Manuals 
(OECD, 2002 and 2005, respectively) –, it is not straightforward to find the most appropriate 
way to assess R&D and innovation performance. To start with, R&D is such a complex, 
multifaceted process that it cannot be sufficiently characterized by two or three indicators, and 
that applies to innovation a fortiori. Hence, there is always a need to select a certain set of 
indicators to depict innovation processes, and especially to analyze and assess innovation 
performance. The choice of indicators is, therefore, an important decision reflecting the 
mindset of those decision-makers who have chosen them. These figures are ‘subjective’ in 
that respect, but as they are expressed in numbers, most people perceive indicators as being 
‘objective’ by definition. 
An equally difficult task is to devise so-called composite indicators to compress 
information into a single figure in order to compile eye-catching scoreboards. A major source 
of complication is choosing an appropriate weight to be assigned to each component. By 
conducting sensitivity analyses of the 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), Grupp 
and Schubert (2010) have shown how unstable the rank configuration is when the weights are 
changed (p. 72). Besides assigning weights, three other ranking methods are also widely used, 
namely: unweighted averages, Benefit of the Doubt (BoD) and principal component analysis. 
Comparing these three methods, the authors conclude: ‘(…) even using accepted approaches 
like BoD or factor analysis may result in drastically changing rankings’ (ibid: 74). Hence, 
they propose using multidimensional representations, e.g. spider charts to reflect the 
multidimensional character of innovation processes and performance. That would enable 
analysts and policy-makers to identify strengths and weaknesses, that is, more precise targets 
for policy actions (ibid: 77). 
Other researchers also emphasize the need for a sufficiently detailed characterization of 
innovation processes. For example, a family of five indicators – R&D, design, technological, 
skill, and innovation intensities – offers a more diversified picture on innovativeness than the 
Summary Innovation Index of the EIS (Laestadius et al., 2005). Using Norwegian data they 
demonstrate that the suggested method can capture variety in knowledge formation and 
innovativeness both within and between sectors. It thus supports a more accurate 
understanding of creativity and innovativeness inside and across various sectors, directs 
policy-makers’ attention to this diversity (suppressed by the OECD classification of sectors), 
and thus can better serve policy needs. 
3.1 The European Innovation Scoreboard 
As already stressed, firms exploit various types of knowledge for their innovation activities. 
Testing this general observation by using the Danish DISKO survey data, Jensen et al. (2007) 
introduced an elementary distinction between two modes of innovation: (a) one based on the 
production and use of codified scientific and technical knowledge, and (b) another relying on 
informal processes of learning and experience-based know-how (called DUI: Doing, Using 
                                                
9 ‘The Innovation Union Scoreboard 2013 gives a comparative assessment of the innovation performance of the 
EU27 Member States and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their research and innovation systems’ (EC, 
2013a: 4). 
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and Interacting). They have noted that none of the 22 indicators that had been used to compile 
the EIS 2004 captured the DUI mode of innovation, which is not an accident: ‘There now 
exist internationally harmonised data on R&D, patenting, the development of S&T human 
resources, ICT expenditures and innovation expenditures more generally, whereas at present 
there are no harmonised data that could be used to construct measures of learning by doing 
and using. We would contend, though, that these limitations of the data reflect the same bias 
at a deeper level. (…) The lack of DUI measures reflects political priorities and decision-
making rather than any inevitable state of affairs’ (ibid: 685). 
The EIS indicators have been revised several times since its first edition in 2000, and the 
scoreboard was renamed the Innovation Union Scoreboard in 2011. Its 2013 edition is based 
on 25 indicators, grouped by eight innovation dimensions. (EC, 2013a) A rudimentary 
classification exercise reveals a strong bias towards R&D-based innovations: 10 indicators are 
only relevant for, and a further four mainly capture, R&D-based innovations, a mere five are 
focusing on non-R&D-based innovations, while six could be relevant for both types of 
innovations. (Table 1) Given that (i) the IUS is used by the European Commission to monitor 
progress, and (ii) its likely impact on national policy-makers, this bias towards R&D-based 
innovation is a source of major concern. 
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Table 1: The 2013 Innovation Union Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Human resources 
New doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1000 population aged 25-34 X  
Percentage population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary education b b 
Percentage youth aged 20-24 having attained at least upper secondary level 
education  X 
Open, excellent and attractive research systems 
International scientific co-publications per million population X  
Scientific publications among the top 10% most cited publications 
worldwide as % of total scientific publications of the country X  
Non-EU doctorate students as a % of all doctorate students X  
Finance and support 
R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of GDP X  
Venture capital investment as % of GDP x  
Firm investments 
R&D expenditure in the business sector as % of GDP X  
Non-R&D innovation expenditures as % of turnover  X 
Linkages & entrepreneurship 
SMEs innovating in-house as % of SMEs b b 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others as % of SMEs b b 
Public-private co-publications per million population X  
Intellectual assets 
PCT patents applications per billion GDP (in PPS€) X  
PCT patent applications in societal challenges per billion GDP (in PPS€) 
(environment-related technologies; health) X  
Community trademarks per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
Community designs per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
Innovators 
SMEs introducing product or process innovations as % of SMEs b b 
SMEs introducing marketing or organizational innovations as % of SMEs  X 
High-growth innovative firms b b 
Economic effects 
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities (manufacturing and 
services) as % of total employment x  
Contribution of medium and high-tech product exports to the trade balance x  
Knowledge-intensive services exports as % total service exports x  
Sales of new to market and new to firm innovations as % of turnover b b 
License and patent revenues from abroad as % of GDP X  
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
 
The current composition of IUS indicators can be seen either as a half-full or a half-empty 
glass. Compared to the EIS 2004 – as assessed by Jensen et al. (2007) – it is an improvement. 
Considering the economic weight of LMT sectors and the fact that the bulk of innovation in 
these sectors is not based on intramural R&D efforts (Sandven et al., 2005; von Tunzelmann 
and Acha, 2005, special issue of Research Policy on Innovation in LMT industries, Vol. 38, 
No. 3), a much more significant improvement is still needed to better reflect innovation 
processes by the IUS, and thus underpin effective and sound policies. 
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3.2 A new league table: research and innovation performance of EU member states and 
associated countries 
The EC Directorate-General for Research and Innovation is publishing country profiles aimed 
at ‘providing policy makers and stakeholders with concise, holistic and comparative 
overviews of research and innovation (R&I) in individual countries’ (EC, 2013b: 2). The 
2011 report identified nine groups of countries and then Hungary – together with the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Slovakia, and Slovenia – belonged to group 8, characterized by ‘medium-low 
knowledge capacity with an important industry base’ (EC, 2011: 436). A new feature in the 
2013 edition is a synthesis table with some striking figures: Ireland has the highest level of 
knowledge-intensity, and Hungary is ranked ninth, ahead of Germany, Austria and the EU 
average, for example, and just behind Denmark and Finland (Table 2). 
Table 2: Overview of research and innovation performance in selected EU countries 
 
R&D 
intensity 
(2011) 
Excellence 
in S&T 
(2010) 
Index of 
economic 
impact of 
innovation 
(2010-2011) 
Knowledge-
intensity of 
economy (2010) 
HT & MT 
contribution to 
trade balance 
(2011) 
Ireland 1.72 38.11 0.690 65.43 2.57 
Sweden 3.37 77.20 0.652 64.60 2.02 
United Kingdom 1.77 56.08 0.621 59.24 3.13 
Belgium 2.04 59.92 0.599 58.88 2.37 
France 2.25 48.24 0.628 57.01 4.65 
Netherlands 2.04 78.86 0.565 56.22 1.68 
Denmark 3.09 77.65 0.713 54.95 -2.77 
Finland 3.78 62.91 0.698 52.17 1.69 
Hungary 1.21 31.88 0.527 50.23 5.84 
European Union 2.03 47.86 0.612 48.75 4.20 
Estonia 2.38 25.85 0.450 46.48 -2.70 
Slovenia 2.47 27.47 0.521 45.90 6.05 
Germany 2.84 62.78 0.813 44.94 8.54 
Austria 2.75 50.46 0.556 42.40 3.18 
Portugal 1.50 26.45 0.387 41.04 -1.20 
Czech Republic 1.84 29.90 0.497 39.58 3.82 
Spain 1.33 36.63 0.530 36.76 3.05 
Italy 1.25 43.12 0.556 35.43 4.96 
Lithuania 0.92 13.92 0.223 35.28 -1.27 
Latvia 0.70 11.49 0.248 34.38 -5.42 
Greece 0.60 35.27 0.345 32.53 -5.69 
Poland 0.77 20.47 0.313 31.78 0.88 
Slovakia 0.68 17.73 0.479 31.64 4.35 
Romania 0.48 17.84 0.384 28.35 0.38 
Source: EC (2013b): 5 
Note: Countries are ranked by the knowledge-intensity indicator. 
The ‘knowledge-intensity of the economy’ is defined as follows: ‘Eight compositional 
structural change indicators have been identified and organized into five dimensions: 
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• The R&D dimension measures the size of business R&D (as a % of GDP) and the size 
of the R&D services sector in the economy (…); 
• The skills dimension measures changing skills and occupation in terms of the share of 
persons employed in knowledge intensive activities; 
• The sectoral specialization dimension captures the relative share of knowledge intensive 
activities; 
• The international specialization dimension captures the share of knowledge economy 
through technological (patents) and export specialization (revealed technological and 
competitive advantage); 
• The internationalization dimension refers to the changing international competitiveness 
of a country in terms of attracting and diffusing foreign direct investment (inward and 
outward foreign direct investments). 
(…) The five pillars have also been aggregated to a single composite indicator of structural 
change (…)’ (ibid: 321–322). 
Knowledge is understood again in a narrow sense: only higher education and R&D 
activities are supposed to create it and thus all other types of knowledge are disregarded. The 
name of this indicator is, therefore, misleading. The inclusion of high-tech exports and foreign 
direct investment in this composite indicator explains the unexpectedly high ranking of 
Ireland and Hungary: in both countries high-tech goods account for an extremely large share 
in exports (Table 3) and high-tech sectors are dominated by foreign-owned firms. 
Table 3: Share of high-tech goods in industrial exports, 2001-2009 (%) 
 
2001 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ireland 58.0 52.1 48.9 46.6 48.9 52.2 
Hungary 28.3 31.7 30.8 29.9 30.6 35.5 
Netherlands 29.6 30.1 28.7 27.4 25.2 29.1 
United Kingdom 35.8 27.7 27.4 26.1 25.1 n.a. 
France 25.2 22.8 23.7 22.5 23.0 n.a. 
Finland 24.3 25.3 21.9 20.0 19.7 17.1 
Slovak Republic 6.0 11.3 14.4 16.9 19.4 n.a. 
Sweden 23.1 21.3 21.4 18.9 18.6 21.9 
Czech Republic 11.8 15.0 16.8 17.5 17.9 18.8 
Belgium 14.4 17.8 16.8 17.7 17.4 22.0 
Germany 20.3 19.7 19.5 17.7 17.2 19.5 
Denmark 19.6 20.1 18.1 17.3 15.6 17.9 
Slovenia 10.8 10.7 11.5 11.6 13.0 15.0 
Austria 15.4 13.3 12.9 12.8 12.4 14.0 
Greece 8.7 12.9 11.5 10.7 11.8 14.8 
Spain 10.2 11.1 10.6 10.3 10.1 11.3 
Poland 6.5 6.3 7.4 8.1 9.8 n.a. 
Italy 11.8 10.7 10.1 9.3 9.1 10.8 
Estonia 25.5 21.5 16.4 9.5 8.9 8.0 
Luxembourg 15.7 10.1 10.0 8.6 6.8 10.4 
Portugal 11.3 11.5 11.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: own calculation based on OECD.Stat data, extracted on 9 Sept 2013 
n.a.: not available 
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These ‘twinned’ characteristics warrant further remarks from the point of view of knowledge-
intensity. The bulk of exported high-tech goods are developed outside Ireland or Hungary;10 
the main activity of most foreign subsidiaries is the assembly of high-tech goods by semi-
skilled workers, and thus the local knowledge content is rather low. These features cannot be 
reflected in this indicator, and thus it does not necessarily express knowledge-intensity in the 
case of countries with similar structural characteristics. Hence, it may only be used ‘with a 
pinch of salt’ to compare countries’ performance or devise policy measures. 
In more detail, two major policy lessons can be drawn from this. First, policies aimed at 
promoting innovation and hence competitiveness should consider the actual activities of 
firms, rather than relying on the OECD classification of sectors. Four levels of analysis should 
be distinguished: activities, products, firms and sectors. Firms belonging to the same 
statistical sector might possess quite different innovation, production, management, and 
marketing capabilities. Furthermore, they are unlikely to produce identical goods, in terms of 
e.g. skills and investment required, quality or market and profit opportunities. Finally, they 
perform different activities, especially in regard to their knowledge-intensity. These 
dissimilarities are likely to be even more pronounced when we consider sectors, firms, 
products and activities across different countries. In short, policies that neglect the intra-
sectoral diversity of firms cannot be effective. 
Second, various types of foreign direct investment activities have different longer-term 
impacts on economic development. Globalization either poses threats to, or offers 
opportunities for, economic development, depending on the capabilities and investment 
promotion policies of the host country. To use an elementary dichotomy of foreign direct 
investment, one type can be called ‘foot-loose’, that is, characterized by low local knowledge 
content, and thus offer low-pay jobs. These companies are ready to leave at any time for 
cheaper locations.11 The other types of investors, in contrast, are ‘anchored’ into a national 
system of production and innovation: they conduct knowledge-intensive activities, create 
higher-pay jobs, build close contacts with domestic R&D units and universities and develop a 
strong local supplier base.12 In brief, coordinated, mindful investment promotion, STI, human 
resource and regional development policies are required to embed foreign investors. In this 
way, skills can be upgraded, local suppliers’ innovation capabilities can be improved to boost 
their competitiveness and intense, mutually beneficial business-academia collaboration can be 
nurtured. Otherwise most of the investment ‘sweeteners’ are wasted if foreign firms only use 
a given region or country as a cheap, temporary production site. 
                                                
10 BERD in the ‘Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (C26)’ sector was €152–155m in 
Ireland, €53–56m in Hungary, while €527m in Austria in 2009–2010. (Eurostat) Austria has been chosen for 
comparison given her similar size (in terms of population) and lower ranking in Table 2 by knowledge-intensity 
of economy. BERD in pharmaceuticals is not considered here given the sector’s small share in Hungarian 
manufacturing (and high-tech) exports (around 10% of exports by C26). 
11 Radosevic (2002) offers a thorough survey of the electronics industry in Central and Eastern European 
countries, Scotland and Wales. His analysis of plant closures and downsizing is a good illustration of the 
behavior of ‘foot-loose’ investors. 
12 There are different types of firms among the ‘anchored’ ones, too. This simple dichotomy is used here just to 
highlight some elementary policy implications, not as a basis for sound policy recommendations. 
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4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 A persistent devotion to high-tech and its pitfalls 
Several observers claim that the systems view on innovation has become widespread in 
academic and policy-making circles, both in national and supranational organizations. As for 
the latter, they are notably the European Commission and the OECD (Sharif, 2006; Dodgson 
et al., 2011). By discussing the indicators selected for the European Innovation Scoreboard 
(more recently: Innovation Union Scoreboard), as well as the use of these and related 
indicators in a 2013 league table of innovation performance of EU countries, this chapter has 
shown that the high-tech myth prevails. Glancing through various EU and OECD reports also 
confirms that the systems view has not become a systematically applied paradigm in policy 
circles13 – in spite of a rich set of policy-relevant research insights. The ‘push for science-
push’ is further reinforced by the images of scientists and/or their sophisticated equipment 
consistently used on the cover pages of various EU and OECD reports.14 
The high-tech myth is so powerful that even those researchers who base their work on 
thorough analysis of facts are taken by surprise when the facts are at odds with the obsession 
with high-tech. A telling example is Peneder’s excellent study on the ‘Austrian paradox’: ‘On 
the one hand, macroeconomic indicators on productivity, growth, employment and foreign 
direct investment indicate that overall performance is stable and highly competitive. On the 
other hand, an international comparison of industrial structures reveals a severe gap in the 
most technologically advanced branches of manufacturing, suggesting that Austria is having 
problems establishing a foothold in the dynamic markets of the future’ (Peneder, 1999: 239). 
In contrast, evolutionary economics of innovation claims that any firm – in either LMT or HT 
industries – can become competitive in ‘the dynamic markets of the future’ if it is successful 
in combining its own, firm-specific innovative capabilities with ‘extra-mural’ knowledge 
available in distributed knowledge bases. In other words, Austrian policy-makers need not be 
concerned with the observed ‘paradox’ as long as they help Austrian firms sustain their 
learning capabilities, and maintain thereby their innovativeness. That would lead to good 
economic performance – regardless of the share of LMT industries in the economy. 
The science-push model neglects the importance of distributed knowledge bases – 
regional, sectoral and national innovation systems and clusters – in creating, diffusing and 
exploiting various non-R&D types of knowledge (Dodgson and Rothwell, 1994; Freeman, 
1991, 1994; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; Malerba, 2002; Nelson (ed.), 1993; OECD, 2001; 
Smith, 2002; Tidd et al., 1997), and hence it can easily misguide policy: in a ‘hard-core’ 
                                                
13 A recent OECD policy document equates innovation with R&D at several points: ‘Innovation today is a 
pervasive phenomenon and involves a wider range of actors than ever before. Once largely carried out by 
research and university laboratories in the private and government sectors, it is now also the domain of civil 
society, philanthropic organisations and, indeed, individuals’ (OECD, 2010: 3, emphasis added). The same 
document has a sub-section entitled ‘Low-technology sectors innovate’, but the bulk of the text is on R&D. 
A current EU document also consistently equates knowledge with R&D: investment in knowledge is understood 
as changes in R&D intensity, knowledge intensity of economic sectors is measured by BERD, and ‘knowledge 
upgrade’ is defined as increased R&D intensity (EC, 2013b: 7, 9, 10, 11). The same document, just like many 
other EC documents (e.g. EC, 2013c), speaks of a ‘research and innovation system’, and thus implicitly suggests 
that the (public) research system is not a sub-system of the national innovation system, but a separate entity. 
Research and innovation is used in a very loose way, practically as synonyms: ‘There are still considerable 
differences between Member States in terms of their research and innovation efficiency. For a given amount of 
public investment, some countries achieve more excellence than others in science and technology’ (ibid: 9). 
14 See, e.g., the OECD’s ‘STI Scoreboard’ and ‘STI Outlook’ series until 2007 and 2008, respectively, as well as 
the Eurostat’s ‘Science, technology and innovation in Europe’ series in the late 2000s (OECD, 2004, 2005b, 
2006b, 2007, 2008; EC, 2008, 2009, 2010). 
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translation it implies that public money should be primarily spent on promoting research 
efforts in a handful of fashionable S&T domains, and on boosting high-tech sectors. A recent 
EC document is also pushing – or only hoping? – for structural changes, along similar lines, 
although this is not explicitly articulated in that way: ‘Furthermore, in dynamic fields such as 
ICT-based businesses and in emerging sectors Europe needs more high-growth firms. This 
calls for an innovation-driven structural change, but Europe is at present missing out on the 
more radical innovations which drive and lead such structural change’ (EC 2013c: 5). In line 
with the science-push model, other modes of technological innovation are not mentioned in 
this document. 
The EC documents are rather consistent in that respect over time: the so-called Barcelona 
target, namely achieving a 3% GERD/GDP ratio in the EU – first set in March 2002, and then 
relaunched in 2010 as part of the Europe 2020 strategy – is also driven by this rationale: R&D 
efforts need to be stepped up, because significantly larger inputs would thereby be 
transformed into useful outputs. In other words, research insights are translated into policy 
actions in a disappointing way in the Lisbon Agenda: ‘(…) the focus remains on (…) 
mobilizing investment for research and development, translating science into technology, and 
attempting to create a population of new technology-based firms’ (Steinmuller, 2009: 29). 
The policy rationale derived from mainstream economics, namely the market failure 
argument, in essence is ‘informed’ by the science-push model, but in turn it also provides 
strong scientific support to this type of policy-making, given its roots in rigorous, quantitative 
analyses. Three comments are in order. First, even when accepting the market failure rationale 
as a relevant one, ‘(…) it does not give any secure guide to how to identify areas of market 
failure, or the appropriate levels of public support which might follow from it.’ (Smith, 2000: 
85) Second, a policy action tackling a market failure would, in most cases, lead to another 
market failure. Patents, for example, distort prices to the detriment of customers, and may also 
result either in over- or under-investment in R&D, neither of which is ‘socially optimal’ 
(Bach and Matt, 2005). Third, the innovation systems approach has shown that the 
mainstream economics paradigm offers an inappropriate framework to fully understand 
innovation processes involving a fundamental element of uncertainty and characterized by 
cumulativeness and path-dependence. The market failure rationale thus rests on a theory that 
does not offer a sound, indisputable understanding of those processes that are to be influenced 
by policies justified by this very rationale. Spending public money guided by an inappropriate 
– or at best incomplete – policy rationale is, therefore, highly questionable. 
In sum, policies driven by the science-push model – or its close ‘relative’, the market 
failure argument derived from mainstream economics – disregard non-R&D types of 
knowledge, which are of huge significance for innovation processes in the LMT branches of 
manufacturing and services. Given the substantial economic weight of these sectors in 
producing value added and creating employment, this policy ignorance is likely to lead to 
massive opportunity costs, e.g. in the form of lost improvements in productivity, ‘unborn’ 
new products and services, and thus ‘unopened’ new markets and ‘undelivered’ new jobs. 
Scoreboards and league tables compiled following the science-push logic, and published 
by supranational organizations, can easily lead to ‘lock-in’ situations. National policy-makers 
– and politicians, in particular – are likely to pay much more attention to their country’s 
position on a scoreboard than to nuanced assessments or policy recommendations in lengthy 
documents, and hence this inapt logic is ‘diffused’ and strengthened at the national level, too, 
preventing policy learning and the devising of appropriate policies. 
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4.2 Possible reasons for the observed persistence 
Even without analyzing the complex issue of paradigm shifts in STI policy thinking and 
practice in a systematic and detailed way, it is worth considering some possible reasons why 
the science-push model is so popular and powerful. Although this chapter has not analyzed 
STI policy rationales at a national level, the ensuing discussion would include that level, too. 
To start with a simple reason, the science-push model is based on a fairly simple, 
straightforward reasoning.15 Moreover, it was compellingly explained and popularized many 
decades ago by Bush (1945), given the unprecedented achievements of major R&D efforts 
during World War II.16 Impressive scientific results have been reported in the press ever since 
then, reiterating the relevance and usefulness of science in the mind of politicians and citizens 
at large. 
The simplicity of policy-making following the science-push model can be important in 
further respects, too. To paraphrase Laestadius et al. (2005) who talk about the advantages of 
one-dimensional indicators, the so-called Barcelona target ‘has obvious pedagogical 
advantages: people remember [it], they react on [it] and (at least believe that) they can 
identify the meaning of [it]. (…) As regards community creation it may be argued that a 
simple one-dimensional indicator (…) can be identified as a focal point for orchestrated 
political action: we can all unite on transforming Europe to a high-tech knowledge-based 
economy.’ 
The networked model of innovation and other concepts of the evolutionary economics of 
innovation are, in contrast, not only complex, but can also be ‘vague’ for policy-makers. 
Indeed, the systems of innovation approach can easily be interpreted sarcastically: if 
everything depends on everything else, there is no clear policy guidance. 
International politics in the form of the so-called Triadic competition between Europe, 
Japan, and the US also played a role in strengthening the obsession with the science-push 
model already in the 1960s (Hirsch-Kreinsen et al., 2005), and it still features in recent EU 
documents: ‘Overall, the EU remains specialised in medium-high R&D-intensity sectors 
which account for half of European companies’ R&D investment. By contrast, more than 
two-thirds of US companies’ R&D investment is clustered in high R&D-intensity sectors 
(such as health and ICT)’ (EC 2013c: 7). This adamant obsession with the EU-US comparison 
is all the more puzzling when one takes into account some fundamental differences: the EU is 
not a federal structure, and despite the Single Market principle it is much more fragmented in 
many respects than the US, with severe consequences for e.g. capital flows and labor mobility 
– and hence for the diffusion and exploitation of knowledge –, as well as for the feasibility of 
large, mission-oriented R&D projects and EU-wide policy actions, including public 
procurement with regard to new products or solutions. 
Sociological factors are also likely to play an important role. Top STI policy-makers, as 
well as the majority of middle-ranking staff, tend to be former scientists or engineers, and 
thus naturally with a strong inclination towards the Bush-model (Bush, 1945). Civil servants 
                                                
15 ‘Despite the fierce criticism they have attracted from the more popular systemic approaches, these linear 
models paradoxically continue to influence thinking amongst decision-makers and public opinion because they 
have the virtue of being simple (or of appearing to be so)’ – writes Caracostas (2007: 475), drawing on his 
extensive work experience as a ‘policy-shaper’ at the EC. Since then, Balconi et al (2010) have assembled a set 
of arguments ‘in defence of the linear model’. 
16 Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. (2005) offer two further historical considerations: the internal organization and 
management methods of large corporations in the 20th century, as well as the cold war, namely the ‘sputnik 
panic’ and the US reply to that. 
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at finance ministries, who prepare decisions on the budget lines earmarked for public funding 
for RTDI activities, are usually trained in mainstream economics, and thus they are not 
advancing the policy rationale of the evolutionary economics of innovation, either (Dodgson 
et al. 2011; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999). Prestigious scientists have also become influential in 
setting STI policies, and their influence is strengthened by their formal positions, too (as chief 
scientists, advisors to politicians, presidents of learned societies, members of advisory boards, 
etc.). 17  Finally, the quest for evidence-based policies has significantly increased the 
intellectual standing and influence of formal modeling among policy-makers  (Caracostas, 
2007: 479). It should be stressed in light of this that (a) the complexity of innovation systems 
cannot be translated into econometric models,18 and (b) in new (endogenous) growth models a 
main variable is R&D – and not knowledge in its broad sense, even if R&D and knowledge 
are used as synonyms in many papers. 
4.3 Policy implications of the systemic view of innovation 
A fundamental element of the pragmatic critique of the innovation systems approach certainly 
holds: policy implications derived from evolutionary theorizing are demanding in terms of 
both analytical efforts needed to underpin policies and policy design capabilities. The market 
failure rationale is an abstract concept; its policy implications are supposed to apply to any 
market in any country, and at any time – but as already stressed, exactly for being abstract, it 
cannot provide appropriate guidance for policy design. The systemic failures argument, in 
contrast, cannot offer ‘one-size-fits-all’ recipes. Instead, it stresses that it is an empirical task 
to identify what type of failure(s) is (are) blocking innovation processes in what part of the 
system in order to guide the design of appropriate policies.19 Besides thorough analyses, it is 
likely to demand extensive dialogue with stakeholders, too. This is not a trivial task, and the 
possibility of summarizing widely applicable, easy-to-digest and thus appealing policy 
‘prescriptions’ in one or two paragraphs is excluded on theoretical grounds. 
The systemic approach implies, too, that several policies affect innovation processes and 
performance – and perhaps even more strongly than STI policies. Hence, the task of designing 
effective and efficient policies to promote innovation is even more complex as policy goals 
and tools need to be orchestrated across several policy domains, including macroeconomic, 
education, investment promotion, regional development, and labor market policies, as well as 
health, environment and social policies aimed at tackling societal challenges. 
In an interesting ‘cross-tabulation’ of innovation research themes and policy perspectives, 
den Hertog et al. (2002) identified ‘black boxes’, that is, themes not covered by research and 
also unknown (unidentified) by policy-makers. Given the importance of non-STI policies 
affecting innovation policies, it would be useful to add a black box at a ‘meta level’, too: that 
is, the impacts of non-STI policies – or even more broadly, that of the framework conditions – 
on innovation processes and performance. 
                                                
17 These factors have been at play in Australia, too: ‘Despite significant input from innovation researchers on the 
value of innovation systems thinking, the Summit’s outcomes were largely shaped by neo-classical economic 
orthodoxy and a continued science-push, linear approach advocated by the research sector’ (Dodgson et al., 
2011: 1150). 
18 This critique has been ‘anticipated’ and answered by Lipsey and Carlaw (1998: 48): ‘For obvious reasons, 
many economists prefer models that provide precise policy recommendations, even in situations in which the 
models are inapplicable to the world of our existence. Our own view is that, rather than using neo-classical 
models that give precise answers that do not apply to situations in which technology is evolving endogenously, it 
is better to face the reality that there is no optimal policy with respect to technological change.’ 
19 For various taxonomies of systemic failures, see, e.g. Bach and Matt (2005), Malerba (2009) and Smith 
(2000). 
  
15 
It is also worth revisiting two issues previously addressed in this chapter from a new angle. 
The first one is the design and use of scoreboards or league tables for assessing countries’ 
performance. A straightforward implication of the systemic view is that, given the diversity 
among innovation systems (in this case: among national innovation systems), one should be 
very careful when trying to draw policy lessons from the ‘rank’ of a country as ‘measured’ by 
a composite indicator. A scoreboard can only be constructed by using the same set of 
indicators across all countries, and by applying an identical method to calculate the composite 
index. Yet, analysts and policy-makers need to realize that poor performance as signaled by 
certain indicators, and leading to a low ranking on the scoreboard, does not automatically 
identify the area(s) necessitating the most urgent policy actions. For example, in the case of 
several indicators measuring performance in ‘high-tech’, for a country at a lower level of 
economic development it might be more relevant to focus scarce public resources on 
improving the conditions for knowledge dissemination and exploitation, rather than spending 
money on creating scientific knowledge. This is a gross oversimplification, of course, that is, 
far from any policy recommendation at the required level of detail. It is only meant to 
reiterate that it is a demanding task to devise policies based on the innovation systems 
approach. Moreover, as the Hungarian and Irish cases have shown, a high value of a 
composite indicator would not necessarily signal good performance: the devil is always in the 
details. 
The second issue is the major differences between mainstream economics and the 
evolutionary economics of innovation. The choice of an economics paradigm to guide policy 
evaluation is likely to be decisive: assessing the impacts of the same policy measure by 
following the neo-classical paradigm leads to certain conclusions on efficacy and efficiency, 
while doing so within the evolutionary frame yields drastically different ones (Lipsey and 
Carlaw, 1998). Policy-makers need to consider these differences, too, when making a choice 
as to which paradigm is to be followed. 
Finally, some basic principles for policy-making can be distilled from the systemic view of 
innovation. Given the characteristics of the innovation process, public policies should be 
aimed at promoting learning in its widest possible sense: competence building at individual, 
organizational and inter-organizational levels; in all economic sectors, in all possible ways, 
considering all types of knowledge, emanating from various sources. Further, as it already 
occurs in some countries, innovation (and other) policies should promote the introduction of 
new processes and methods in public services and administration, too. New indicators that 
better reflect evolutionary processes of learning and innovation would also be needed to 
support policy-making in this new way. Developing, piloting and then widely collecting these 
new indicators would be a major, demanding and time-consuming project, necessitating 
extensive international cooperation. 
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